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VIRGINIA COMMENTS
same remedies for the seller whose buyer breaches as did Virginia case
law. However, the technical concept of passage of title has been elimi-
nated, thus broadening the application of these remedies and pro-
viding for Virginia a body of law that is more in line with modern
commercial practices.
CHARIEs B. ROWE
BUYER'S REMEDIES AND ARTICLE 2
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,' which deals with
the sales of goods, broadens the remedies available to the buyer. A
buyer no longer has to worry about the uniqueness of chattels in
regard to obtaining specific performance of the goods involved, and
also, he may accept tender of the goods without precluding himself
from recovering damages.
The buyer's remedies under the UCC can be conveniently grouped
into three categories: (i) the buyer's right to reject nonconforming
goods, (2) the buyer's right to recover damages, and (3) the buyer's
remedies which "reach" the goods. One or more of these remedies will
arise if the seller repudiates the contract, breaches the contract by
failing to deliver, by making a delivery that is improper, or becomes
insolvent.2
RIGHT OF REJECTION OF NONCONFORMING GOODS
Section 2-6o of the Uniform Commercial Code gives the buyer a
right to reject nonconforming goods. The buyer, upon receipt of an
improper delivery in any respect, may: (a) reject the whole, (b) accept
the whole, or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the
rest.3 A buyer accepting a nonconforming tender is not penalized by
the loss of any remedy otherwise open to him.
Allowing the buyer to accept any commercial unit, even though
the tender is nonconforming, changes Virginia law as expressed in
Charles Syer & Co. v. Lester.5 In this case, the Supreme Court of Ap-
"Hereinafter referred to as UCC.
-Phalan, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Summary of Buyer's Remedies, 16
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 2o9 (1955).
3UCC § 2-6o. This section must be read in conjunction with UCC § 2-718 and
UCC § 2-719 in regard to the contractual limitations of remedies.
'UCO § 2-6o,, Comment, Point 1.
S116 Va. 541, 82 S.E. 122 (1914). See also Lamborn Co. v. Bristol Grocery
Co., 140 Va. 77, 124 S.E. 184 (1924).
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peals required the buyer either to reject the whole or to accept the
whole under protest and sue to recover the damages sustaind by the
breach. The Virginia rule has not been applied where the seller
has agreed to take back the nonconforming goods.6 Virginia also has
applied the rule where the buyer accepts a portion of the goods de-
livered for a reason that is not inconsistent with his subsequent
refusal to accept the balance of the goods. 7
The UCC8 imposes two affirmative duties upon the buyer who
would seek to reject the goods as nonconforming: (i) he must reject
within a reasonable time after tender of the goods, and (2) he must
seasonably notify the seller of his rejection. In addition, the UCC re-
quires the buyer to use reasonable care to preserve the goods for a
reasonable time to permit the seller to remove them.9 A merchant buyer
must follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller in
regard to the goods, and, in the absence of such instructions, make a
reasonable effort to sell the goods if they are perishable.10 Virginia
law has not been extended so as to impose these additional duties
on the rejecting buyer.
The UCC modifies the stringent Virginia rule referred to in Field-
ing v. Robertson" that a buyer who objects to goods on one stated
ground cannot later object on other grounds. This Virginia rule im-
poses undue hardship on buyers, if they give quick and informal notices
that fail to state all the defects. UCC section 2-605 ends this inequity
by permitting the buyer to give an informal notice of the defects, with-
out imposing penalties on him for omissions, while at the same time
protecting the seller who is misled by the buyer's failure to particu-
larize.12
Virginia has permitted a buyer to rescind a sales transaction even
after he has accepted the goods. This was the situation in Universal
Motor Co. v. Snow.' 3 The UCC changes this rule. Section 2-607(2)
'Lamborn & Co. v. Bristol Grocery Co., 14o Va. 77, 124 S.E. 184 (1924).
-Rennolds v. Avery, 132 Va. 335, Mii S.E. 123 (1922); Gibney SL Co. v. Arlington
Brewery Go., 112 Va. 117, 70 S.E. 485 (1911).




U 14 1 Va. 123, 126 S.E. 231 (1925). Where the buyer declined to receive meal
because of the delay in delivery, there was no waiver of his right to refuse delivery
because of a deficiency in quantity, where he did not know of the deficiency at the
time of repudiation.
12UCG § 2-6o5, Comment, Point o.
13149 Va. 690, 140 S.E. 653 (1927).
1963] VIRGINIA COMMENTS 275
provides that an acceptance of the goods precludes any subsequent
rejection, and a buyer who had knowledge or should have had
knowledge of the nonconformity cannot revoke an acceptance of non-
conforming goods. Under the UCC, the buyer accepts the goods when
he: (a) signifies his acceptance to the seller, or (b) fails to make an
effective rejection, but such acceptance does not occur until there has
been a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods14 or (c) does any
act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 15 Where the buyer has
accepted the goods, the seller acquires a right to the price, or in the
case of a partial acceptance, a right to part of the price apportioned on
the basis of the contract price.10
DAMAGES
Under UCC section 2-711(1), a buyer who rightfully rejects the
goods has a choice of remedies. He may: (a) cancel the sales contract;
(b) recover the purchase price advanced to the seller; (c) "cover" and
obtain damages as to all the goods affected whether or not they have
been identified to the contract, or (d) recover damages for nondelivery.
Thus, the UCC continues the right under Virginia law of the buyer
to "cancel," recover the purchase price advanced, and in addition to
obtain damages.'7
After a breach, the UCC allows the buyer to "cover" by making
"in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable pur-
chase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due
from the seller."' 8 This section does little more than provide a handy
label, "cover," for a remedy existing in Virginia law. Several Vir-
ginia cases have made it clear that a buyer may obtain substitute
goods upon learning of the seller's default, and that the buyer's
measure of damages in such a case is the difference between the con-
"UCC § 2-6o6(1)(a). Accord, Rosenbaum Hardware Co. v. Paxton Lumber Co.,
124 Va. 346, 97 S.E. 784 (igig). A purchaser of lumber in carload lots is entitled
to a reasonable time in which to unload the car and to make an inspection or ex-
amination before he is required to accept.
'UCC § 2.-606()(b).
"UCC § 2-607(l), Comment, Point i.
"See Richmond Leather Mfg. Co. v. Fawcett, 13o Va. 484, 107 S.E. 8oo (1921),
for discussion as to the legal alternatives presented to a buyer entitled to rescind
for a breach of contract by the seller.
There are two limitations on the remedies of the buyer: (1) UCC § 2-718
allows the parties to liquidate their damages by agreement, provided the damages
are reasonable; and (2) UCC § 2-719 generally allows such agreements to contain
additions to and alterations of the remedies provided by the UCC.
'"UCC § 2-712. Comment, Point 2 says, the definition of "cover" envisages a
series of contracts or sales as well as a single contract of sale.
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tract price and the price of the replacement goods. 19 Absent a showing
that the buyer acted unreasonably or in bad faith in covering, the
UCC uses the same test for damages as Virginia has used. As long as
the buyer acts reasonably and in good faith, proof that his method
of "cover" was not the cheapest or most effective possible will not
defeat a recovery of damages.
20
The UCC uses cover considerations as a base line for determining
the buyer's damages for nondelivery. Therefore, the buyer's damages
are computed as of the time the buyer learns of the breach. This is
done by subtracting the contract price from the current price pre-
vailing at the place where the buyer would have covered had he
elected to do S0.21
Under Virginia law, which is in accord with the UCC, the proper
measure of damages for the breach of an executory contract to deliver
goods is the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time and place of delivery, with interest thereon until
paid.22 However, if both the purchaser and seller are located in the
same area, and the goods were bought for shipment elsewhere, the
Supreme Court of Appeals in Hopkins v. Le Cato23 measured the
damages at the place where delivery was to be made to the carrier.
Where no market exists at the place of delivery, the rule is well es-
tablished in Virginia that other markets must necessarily be resorted
to in determining the market value of the products. 24 Where the seller
breaks his contract to furnish goods and sells to another buyer, and
"Goldstein v. Old Dominion Peanut Corp., 177 Va. 716, 15 S.E.2d 103 (1941);
C. G. Blake Co., Inc. v. W. R. Smith and Son, Ltd., 147 Va. 96o 133 S.E. 685 (1926).
Hopkins v. LeGato, 142 Va. 769, 123 S.E. 347 (1924); Triplett v. Nichols, 139 Va.
321, 123 S.E. 339 (1924); Manor v. Hindman, 123 Va. 767, 97 S.E. 332 (1918); Richard-
son Construction Co. v. Whiting Lumber Co., 16 Va. 49o , 82 S.E. 87 (1914); Long
Pole Lumber Co. v. Saxon Lime and Lumber Co., io8 Va. 497, 62 S.E. 349 (1908);
0. H. Perry Tie & Lumber Co. v. Rennolds & Bro., oo Va. 264, 40 S.E. 919 (1902).
"OUCC § 2-712, Comment, Point 2. Accord: Triplett v. Nichols, 139 Va. 321,
123 S.E. 339 (1924)-
*'UCC § 2-713. "The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so
may, under UCC § 2-717, deduct all or part of damages resulting from any breach
of contract from any part of the price still due under the same contract."
2-Sun Co. v. Burrus, 139 Va. 279, 123 S.E. 347 (1924); Richmond Leather Man-
ufacturing Co. v. Fawcett, 13o Va. 484, 1o7 S.E. 8oo (1921); Nottingham Coal &
Ice Co. v. Preas, 102 Va. 820, 47 S.E. 823 (igo4); Trigg v. Clay, 88 Va. 330, 13 S.E.
434 (i891). If there is no market at the place of delivery, the basis for estimating
the damages of the vendee is the value of the articles in the nearest available
market to which the buyer may resort to supply himself, with the additional costs
of transportation, if any.
23142 Va. 769, a28 S.E. 55 (1925).
-Nottingham Coal & Ice Co. v. Preas, Va. 820, 47 S.E. 823 (1904).
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there is no available market for the buyer to purchase similar goods,
Trigg v. Clay25 held the damages to be the difference between the
contract price and the price at which the buyer had contracted to re-
sell them. The UCC effects no significant changes in these Virginia
decisions.
UCC section 2-714 deals with the remedies of the buyer after the
goods have been accepted and revocation of acceptance is not possible.
The measure of damages for delivery of the nonconforming goods is
the difference (at the time and place of acceptance) between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they
had conformed to the contract.26 Incidental and consequential dam-
ages may also be recovered. 27 Virginia law seems to be in accord.28
The UCC29 and Virginia law30 both allow incidental and conse-
quential damages arising from the seller's breach. The UCC allows
the buyer to recover any consequential damages resulting from general
or particular requirements which the seller at the time of contracting
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by
cover or otherwise. The UCC also allows consequential damages to
the buyer in the case of a loss of a profitable resale because of the sell-
er's breach, if the defaulting seller at the time of the bargain had reason
to know that a resale was contemplated. But the UCC does not seem
to permit speculative damages, and consequently, expected profits are
not allowed by the UCC unless the profit clearly would have been
earned.31
REMEDIES THAT REACH THE GoODS
When the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates the contract,
UCC section 2-76 greatly expands the buyer's remedy of specific per-
188 Va. 33o, 13 S.E. 434 (1891).
2'UCC § 2-714(2).
2USS § 2-714(0).
'Smith v. Hensley, 2o2 Va. 700, i9 S.E.2d 332 (1961); E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Universal Moulded Products Corp., 191 Va. 525, 62 S.E.2d 233 (1950);
Greenland Dev. Corp. v. Allied Heating Products Co., 184 Va. 588, 35 S.E.2d 8ol
(1954); Newbern v. Joseph Baker & Co., 147 Va. 996, 133 S.E. 500 (1926); Reese v.
Bates, 94 Va. 321, 26 S.E. 865 (1897).
2UCC § 2-715.
uBristol Belt Line Ry. v. Bullock Electric Mfg. Co., iol Va. 652, 44 S.E. 892
(103o); 0. H. Perry Tie & Lumber Co. v. Rennolds, 1oo Va. 264, 40 S.E. 919 (1902).
Consumer's Ice Co. v. Jennings, ioo Va. 719, 42 S.E. 879 (1902). For recovery of
profits see Shenandoah Milling Co. v. Phosphate Products Corp., 161 Va. 642, 171
S.E. 631 (1933); Arkla Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. West Virginia Timber Co., 146 Va.
641, 132 S.E. 840 (1926). Mount Rodgers Furniture Co. v. Virginia Mirror Co., 155
Va. 201, 154 S.E. 6oo (1930), said that profits may not be speculative.
31UCC § 2-715(2). Accord, Washington & O.D. Ry. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co., 120 Va. 62o, 89 S.E. 131 (1916); Trigg v. Clay, 88 Va. 330, 13 S.E. 434, 435 (1891).
